Bob Ferguson
LIBRARY—DISTRICTS—CITIES AND TOWNS—PETITIONS—Petition To Establish City Library In City Annexed Within Rural Library District
1. A taxpayer petition does not trigger an election under RCW 27.12.030 on whether to establish a city library when the city is annexed into a rural library district.
2. A proposal for a city to withdraw from a rural library district may be placed before a city’s voters at the discretion of the city council.
3. Under RCW 35A.01.040(9), where petitions are to be signed by the owners of property, it is the county assessor who determines the petition’s sufficiency.
September 22, 2015
The Honorable Tana Senn State Representative, District 41
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Cite As: |
Dear Representative Senn:
By letter previously acknowledged, you have requested our opinion on several questions, which we have rephrased as follows: [1]
1. May a taxpayer petition trigger an election under RCW 27.12.030 on whether a city library shall be established when the city is annexed to a library district?
2. If a taxpayer petition may not trigger an election under RCW 27.12.030 when the city is annexed to a library district, what is the proper process under which such a question can be submitted to the voters?
3. What are the implications of certifying taxpayers under RCW 27.12.030 versus validating signatures?
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BRIEF ANSWERS
1.No. The general rule is ‘that there cannot be two municipal corporations exercising the same functions in the same territory at the same time.” Skagit County Pub. Hosp. Dist. 304 v. Skagit County Pub. Hosp. Dist. 1, 177 Wn.2d 718, 724, 305 P.3d 1079 (2013) (quoting Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wn.2d 319, 321, 382 P.2d 639 (1963)). While the rule is not absolute, here it is clear that the legislature intended there be no overlap by municipalities and library districts in taxation for and provision of library services. This means that where a city is part of a library district, it may not establish an independent library without first, or simultaneously, withdrawing from the district. It is also clear from the statute as a whole that whether to bring before the voters the issue of withdrawal is solely within the discretion of the city’s legislative body and cannot be made by taxpayer petition. But a taxpayer petition requesting a vote on whether to establish a library, while a city is part of a district, would have the effect of triggering an election on the issue of withdrawal. Therefore, such a taxpayer petition is improper under those circumstances.
2.A city’s legislative body may, at its discretion under RCW 27.12.380, put to the city’s voters the question whether to withdraw from a library district. If a majority of the voters approve of withdrawal, then the city may, at its discretion, either establish a library or contract for library services. If the city does neither, the question whether to establish a library may be put before voters by taxpayer petition.
3.Under RCW 35A.01.040(9), where petitions are to be signed by the owners of property, it is the county assessor who determines the petition’s sufficiency. This same statutory provision expressly contemplates that validation of signatures might not be required. For purposes of the library statute, “taxpayers” refers to property owners. The county assessor properly concluded that the statute does not require validation of taxpayer signatures on a petition under RCW 27.12.030.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Your questions arise from recent events involving the City of Mercer Island. Although we answer your questions as a generalized legal analysis, the particular circumstances illustrate the context of your questions.
The City became part of the King County Rural Library District through annexation in 1992. In July 2014, a group of City residents dissatisfied with the District’s library renovation plans submitted a petition of 152 signatures to the City Council, requesting that the Council submit to the voters “the question of whether the City shall establish a City Library consistent with RCW 27.12.030.” The City sent the petition to the county assessor for a determination of sufficiency. The assessor determined that the names on the petition amounted to those of a sufficient number of taxpayers, i.e., property owners, but made no determination as to whether
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the signatures were in fact those of taxpayers or registered voters, explaining that RCW 27.12.030 did not require validation of signatures.
ANALYSIS
1. May a taxpayer petition trigger an election under RCW 27.12.030 on whether a city library shall be established when the city is annexed to a library district?
A taxpayer petition requesting a vote on whether to establish a library cannot be entertained while a city is part of a library district. It is clear from the library statute as a whole and from related statutes that the legislature intended there be no overlap by municipalities and library districts in taxation for and provision of library services. It follows that where a city is part of a library district, it may not establish an independent library without first, or simultaneously, withdrawing from the district. It is also clear from the statute taken as a whole that whether to bring before the voters the issue of withdrawal is solely within the discretion of the city’s legislative body and cannot be made by taxpayer petition. A taxpayer petition requesting a vote on whether to establish a city library while the city is part of a district, if allowed, would have the very effect of triggering an election on the issue of withdrawal, contrary to legislative intent.[2]
a. A city annexed to a library district cannot establish an independent library until it has withdrawn from the district.
A city’s legislative body has the power to establish and maintain an independent library. RCW 27.12.025. It may exercise this power on its own initiative. RCW 27.12.030. It may also be required to do so if one hundred city taxpayers petition it to conduct an election on whether to establish a library, and must then conduct an election; and if a majority then votes in favor of establishing a library, the city must establish one. RCW 27.12.030. However, we conclude that a city cannot establish a library while it is a part of a library district. It must first, or at least simultaneously, withdraw from the district, because the legislature intended there be no overlap by municipalities and library districts in taxation for and provision of library services.
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The statutes governing city libraries, as well as rural library districts, are codified in RCW 27.12. The objective in construing those statutes is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Marriage of Schneider, 173 Wn.2d 353, 363, 268 P.3d 215 (2011). “When possible, [Washington courts derive] legislative intent solely from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Cashmere Valley Bank v. Dep’t of Revenue, 181 Wn.2d 622, 631, 334 P.3d 1100 (2014) (citing Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)).
In construing RCW 27.12, we are mindful of the “‘general rule that there cannot be two municipal corporations exercising the same functions in the same territory at the same time.’” Skagit County Pub. Hosp. Dist. 304, 177 Wn.2d at 724 (quoting Alderwood Water Dist., 62 Wn.2d at 321). Although this rule is not absolute and has been “eroded” by the case law, “‘it continues to serve as a touchstone in the sense that it expresses a public policy against duplication of public functions, and that such duplication is normally not permissible unless it is provided for in some manner by statute.’” Id. (quoting Alderwood Water Dist., 62 Wn.2d at 321). At the very least, “[t]he general rule serves to ‘alert courts . . . to the necessity of closely examining in toto statutory provisions conferring authority upon the potentially competing municipal corporations.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Alderwood Water Dist., 62 Wn.2d at 321).
Here, our close examination of the totality of RCW 27.12 convinces us that the legislature did not intend to allow a city to simultaneously operate its own city library and be part of a rural library district. See Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010) (looking to statutory context to construe a statute’s plain meaning). The intent to prohibit overlapping taxing authorities for the same function runs through the statutes. For example, an existing island library district must be dissolved if a rural county library district is established in the county that encompasses the island. RCW 27.12.450. An existing partial-county library district must be dissolved when a county library district that encompasses the area of the partial-county district is established. RCW 27.12.470; see also RCW 52.08.021 (a city’s annexation of land lying within a fire protection district operates to automatically withdraw such lands from the district).
The legislature also expressed its intent to prohibit overlapping taxing authorities for the same function in the statutory provisions relating to how taxes are levied when towns and cities are annexed into a library district. A rural library district may impose a tax levy throughout the district, including any city that has been annexed into it. RCW 27.12.050. Once it is annexed into the library district, a city surrenders an amount of its levy capacity equal to that imposed by the district for library services. RCW 27.12.390. Thus, once annexed to a library district, a city’s levy capacity is diminished in the amount necessary to establish and maintain a library. See also AGO 1949-1951 No. 121 (also referenced as AGO 1949 No. 54; opinion is dated Sept. 8, 1949) (opining that the legislature intended no overlapping functions between library districts and
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municipalities). A city’s ability unilaterally to establish a library while remaining part of a rural library district would undermine the legislature’s intent to eliminate double taxation for library services.
b. Whether to conduct an election on the question of a city’s withdrawal from a library district cannot be decided by taxpayer petition.
The decision to conduct an election on the question of a city’s withdrawal from a library district is solely within the discretion of the city’s legislative body and cannot be made by taxpayer petition. Were it possible, while a city is annexed to a library district, for a taxpayer petition under RCW 27.12.030 to trigger an election on the question of whether a library shall be established, such petition would in effect bring the issue of withdrawal to a vote. The reason is that, because the legislature intended that there be no overlapping functions between library districts and municipalities, the establishment of a city library would cause or require an immediate withdrawal of the city from the district. However, the statute is clear about how questions of annexation or withdrawal are to be brought before the voters. Such decisions are solely within the discretion of the city’s legislative body.
The conclusion that petitions proposed pursuant to RCW 27.12.030 may not initiate a proposal to withdraw from a library district is evident from the statutory system taken as a whole. See City of Clarkston v. Asotin County Rural Library Bd., 18 Wn. App. 869, 873, 573 P.2d 382 (1977) (“Legislative intent, will, or purpose, is to be ascertained from the statutory text as a whole, interpreted in terms of the general object and purpose of the act.” (quoting Amburn v. Daly, 81 Wn.2d 241, 246, 501 P.2d 178 (1972))). Statutes governing libraries authorize taxpayer petitions in two places only, and for specific, limited purposes. First, RCW 27.12.030 provides for a taxpayer petition to bring before voters the question whether to establish a city library. Second, RCW 27.12.320 provides for a taxpayer petition to bring before voters the question whether to abolish an existing city library. No other provision of the statute authorizes a taxpayer petition for any purpose. In particular, where annexation is provided for, at RCW 27.12.360-.370, it is expressly and solely the city’s legislative body which is authorized to initiate a vote on annexation. Likewise, where a city’s withdrawal from a library district is provided for, at RCW 27.12.380, it is again expressly and solely the city’s legislative body that is authorized to initiate a vote on withdrawal. The statute nowhere provides for a vote on annexation or withdrawal to be initiated by taxpayer petition.
It is well established that where the legislature grants powers to the governing body of a city, rather than to the city itself, those powers are not subject to local initiative. City of Sequim v. Malkasian, 157 Wn.2d 251, 261, 138 P.3d 943 (2006). Here, because the legislature grants to the governing body of a city the power to bring before voters the questions of annexation or withdrawal (see RCW 27.12.360-.380), and does not provide for bringing such questions to the voters by petition, this power is not subject to the initiative process.
Moreover, when the legislature wants to allow for the petition method of bringing a vote on a region’s
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withdrawal from a taxing district, it does so expressly. Thus, in contrast to the withdrawal provision of the library statutes, the legislature did provide for the petition method of bringing a vote on withdrawal in the statutes governing fire protection districts and sewer districts, at RCW 52.08.011 and RCW 57.08.020, respectively. [3]
We conclude that, because the statute does not expressly provide for a taxpayer petition to initiate a vote on withdrawal, but expressly provides for taxpayer petitions elsewhere, the legislature meant to exclude taxpayer petitions as a means of triggering a vote on either annexation or withdrawal.
2. If a taxpayer petition may not trigger an election under RCW 27.12.030 when the city is annexed to a library district, what is the proper process under which such a question can be submitted to the voters?
A city’s legislative body may, at its discretion under RCW 27.12.380, put to the city’s voters the question whether to withdraw from a library district. If a majority of the voters approves of withdrawal, then the city may, at its discretion, either establish a library or contract for library services. If the city does neither after withdrawing from the library district, the question whether to establish a library may be put before voters by taxpayer petition.
3. What are the implications of certifying taxpayers under RCW 27.12.030 versus validating signatures?
If a city is not already part of a library district, RCW 27.12.030 requires the city council to place on the ballot the question of whether to create a library “upon the petition of one hundred taxpayers of such a governmental unit[.]” Your question appears focused on whether such signatures must be “verified” as belonging to registered voters, or instead need only be validated as belonging to taxpayers in the city. For purposes of the library statute, “taxpayers” refers to property owners.
RCW 35A.01.040 governs the sufficiency of signatures on ballot measures. RCW 35A.01.040(4) recognizes that some types of ballot measures require the signatures of “qualified registered voters,” while others require the signature of “property owners,” depending on the type of ballot measure at issue. The same provision assigns the function of certifying the sufficiency of the signatures to different local officers depending on the type of signatures required: “the county auditor for petitions signed by registered voters,” and “the county assessor for petitions signed by property owners.” RCW 35A.01.040(4). RCW 35A.01.040(9) confirms this understanding: “When petitions are required to be signed by the owners of property, the determination shall be made by the county assessor.” That same provision then goes on to specify what qualifies as sufficient evidence of property ownership. Thus, the county assessor properly concluded that the statute requires that the assessor validate that the signers are, in fact, property owners and therefore taxpayers.
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Neither RCW 27.12.030 nor RCW 35A.01.040 requires the county auditor to verify signatures on a petition submitted under RCW 27.12.030 by comparing the petition signatures to those contained in the county’s voter registration database. Indeed, because RCW 27.12.030 requires signatures of 100 “taxpayers,” and does not mention “registered voters” (see also RCW 35A.01.040(9)), it is not required that the signers be registered voters. A comparison with a county’s voter registration database therefore is not required, and that database might not contain the signatures of all taxpayer-signers on this type of petition. As a result, it makes sense for the legislature to have required only the assessor to verify, according to the rules set forth in RCW 35A.01.040(9), which taxpayer signatures can be validly counted.
We trust that the foregoing will be useful to you.
ROBERT W. FERGUSON
Attorney General
H. LEE OVERTON>
Assistant Attorney General
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[1]You originally asked four questions, but the second question was posed only “[i]f the answer to Question 1 is ‘yes.’” Because we answer question one “No,” we have omitted your second question. Additionally, your fourth question originally asked about the distinction between “certification of signatures versus validation of signatures.” It seems clear from the discussion in the memorandum requesting this opinion that the question was intended to focus on the implications of certification of taxpayers as opposed to validation of signatures.
[2]The text sets forth our conclusion as to your first question, but a potential additional issue is worth noting. Washington courts have construed statutory language similar to that of RCW 27.12.030 as obligating executive officials to process proposed ballot measures unless a court orders otherwise. See, e.g., Eyman v. McGehee, 173 Wn. App. 684, 686-87, 294 P.3d 847 (2013) (city clerk had mandatory duty to process local initiative to the ballot); Philadelphia II v. Gregoire, 128 Wn.2d 707, 713, 911 P.2d 389 (1996) (attorney general had mandatory duty to prepare a ballot title for a proposed initiative). The reasoning in such cases is that a statute providing that an executive official “shall” do something is generally construed as creating a mandatory duty. Eyman, 173 Wn. App. at 689 (citing Philadelphia II, 128 Wn.2d at 713). Here, the statute provides that “upon the petition of one hundred taxpayers of [the city], the legislative body shall submit to a vote of the qualified electors[.]” RCW 27.12.030. The task of drawing the legal conclusion that a particular measure is not of the kind that the statute would direct to the ballot is regarded as an exclusively judicial function. Eyman, 173 Wn. App. at 690 (citing Philadelphia II, 128 Wn.2d at 714-15). This does not necessarily mean, however, that a court would order the city to place the measure onto the ballot if it agrees with our conclusion that there is no legal justification for doing so. See Eyman, 173 Wn. App. at 695 (citing Philadelphia II, 128 Wn.2d at 712-13).
[3]It is significant that such petitions must contain the signatures of at least 25 percent of the voters, not a mere one hundred taxpayers. See RCW 52.28.011; RCW 57.08.020.