Other LanguagesThe expiration date set forth in § 2, chapter 67, Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., is only applicable to the amendatory proviso contained in § 1 of that act and not to the entire 106% limitation upon regular property taxes provided for by RCW 84.55.010, et seq.
A coliseum owned jointly by a private corporation and a city is neither wholly nor partially exempted from state and local property taxes under article 7, section 1 of the state constitution or RCW 84.36.010.
A transfer of an interest in real property by a parent corporation to a subsidiary corporation, or by a subsidiary corporation to a parent corporation, is not subject to the one percent real estate excise tax under chapter 28A.45 RCW where the transferee corporation does not issue or transfer stock certificates to the transferor corporation in exchange for the interest in real property thus transferred.
The legislature may constitutionally authorize counties and cities to impose and collect a license fee on motor vehicles and/or a tax on motor vehicle fuel and to use the revenue collected therefrom for purposes other than "highway purposes" as that term is used and defined in Article II, § 40 (Amendment 18) of the Washington Constitution.
Property held or acquired by the Farmers Home Administration pursuant to its loan programs (except for property used for administrative purposes of the agency) is subject to state ad valorem taxation to the same extent as other property.
Voter approval only constitutes a condition precedent to continuation of a port district tax levy under RCW 53.36.100, after the sixth year of the levy, in those instances where, in response to publication of the district's notice of intent to continue the levy, a sufficient petition in opposition thereto has been circulated and filed with the county auditor.
(1) The substantive provisions of §§ 1 through 7 of chapter 40, Laws of 1973, 2nd Ex. Sess., redefining the standards to be applied in determining the eligibility of certain property for an exemption from property taxation, apply to assessments made in 1973 for taxes due and payable in 1974. (2) The procedural requirements of §§ 9 through 19 of chapter 40, Laws of 1973, 2nd Ex. Sess., under which the function of determining the eligibility of property for a tax exemption is, henceforth, to be performed by the state department of revenue instead of the various county assessors and boards of equalization, do not apply in the case of assessments made in 1973 for taxes due and payable in 1974. (3) The remedies available under existing law for taxpayers who, during 1974, received tax statements covering properties which qualify for an exemption under §§ 1 through 7, chapter 40, Laws of 1973, 2nd Ex. Sess., include a request for cancellation of the assessment as provided for in RCW 84.56.400, a suit for a refund pursuant to chapter 84.68 RCW, or an injunction under RCW 84.68.010 (2). (4) The provisions of § 21, chapter 40, Laws of 1973, 2nd Ex. Sess., making a general fund appropriation to the department of revenue to administer the provisions of this new property tax exemption law, do not authorize that department to reimburse the counties for their costs incurred in determining property tax exemptions during the 1973 assessment year.
1.A fire protection district may withdraw an area from the boundaries of the district pursuant to RCW 52.04.056 without first referring such action to a vote of the property owners residing within the withdrawn area.2.A fire protection district may not provide fire and emergency medical services, on a regular basis, to an area that has been withdrawn from the district pursuant to RCW 52.04.056.3.A fire protection district that has withdrawn an area from its boundaries pursuant to RCW 52.04.056 may not "reannex" the area in the same year and thus provide the area with services without subjecting the property in the area to a tax levy for the year.4.Where a fire protection district withdraws territory pursuant to RCW 52.04.056 which constitutes only a portion of another taxing district, and the boundaries of the fire protection district are reestablished after March 1 of a given year, the year's tax levy will be based on the former and not on the reestablished boundaries.5.The procedures in RCW 52.04.056, which govern the withdrawal and reannexation of territories of fire protection districts in certain circumstances, are not subject to the boundary review procedures set forth in chapter 36.93 RCW.
1. A recorded declaration that a property owner holds real estate in "allodial freehold" is ineffective to exempt the real estate from property taxes levied under state law. 2. A declaration of homestead filed on real estate pursuant to chapter 6.13 RCW does not prevent the foreclosure and sale of real estate for unpaid property taxes, as property taxes are not "debts of the owner" and thus are not rendered exempt from execution by RCW 6.13.070.
1. Article 7, section 1, of the Washington Constitution, provides that all taxes on real property be uniform. House Bill 1297 which authorizes payments to certain people, calculated with reference to the taxes levied on their primary residence, does not violate the uniformity requirement. 2. Article 11, section 9, of the Washington Constitution, prohibits releasing or discharging state taxes on a county, its inhabitants or its property. The payment of assistance from funds appropriated for that purpose by the Legislature in House Bill 1297 does not constitute a release or discharge of the state property tax levied for the support of the common schools. 3. Article 8, sections 5 and 7, of the Washington Constitution, prohibit gifts of public funds. The payment of assistance to certain citizens authorized by House Bill 1297 is a gift of public funds because the payments do not carry out a fundamental governmental function and there is no consideration for the payments. 4. Article 8, sections 5 and 7, of the Washington Constitution, do not prohibit gifts of public funds that are necessary for the support of the poor. House Bill 1297 authorized assistance to persons with $30,000 or less of combined disposable income. The question of whether House Bill 1297 constitutes assistance to the poor is, to some degree, a factual question and we cannot say precisely where the court will draw the line between assistance to the poor and an impermissible gift. Some people with incomes of less than $30,000 are, undoubtedly, poor. However, there is substantial doubt whether an individual with an annual income of $30,000 and no dependents is poor. It is unlikely that a court would permit such a person to receive assistance pursuant to House Bill 1297.